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METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR SOURCE 
AUTHENTICATION IN GROUP 
COMMUNICATIONS 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENT 
APPLICATION 
This application claims priority from U.S. Provisional 
Application No. 61/171,216 filed on Apr. 21, 2009, the dis-
closure of which is incorporated herein by reference in their 
entirety. 
STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY 
SPONSORED R&D 
This invention was made under government sponsorship: 
NCC8235 awarded by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). The government has certain rights 
in the invention. 
BACKGROUND 
1. Technical Field 
The present invention relates to source authentication in 
group communications, and more particularly, to a method by 
which a sender sending messages to multiple receivers signs 
the messages using symmetric cryptographic mechanisms 
and the messages can be verified by the receivers as coming 
from the purported sender. 
2. Description of the Related Art 
The following papers provide useful background informa-
tion, for which they are incorporated herein by reference in 
their entirety, and are selectively referred to in the remainder 
of this disclosure by their accompanying reference numbers 
in triangular brackets. For example <1> refers to the 1997 
paper by Krawczyk. 
1. H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti. HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication. IETF RFC 2104, 
February 1997. 
2. N.I.S.T. Digital signature standard (dss), May 19, 1994. 
3. P. R. Zimmermann. The official PGP user's guide. MIT 
Press, May 3, 1995. 
4. R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and D. Solo. Internet X509 
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile. 
IETF Network Working Group RFC 2459, http://www.iet-
t.org/rfc/rfc2459.bd,  January 1999. 
5. S. Gupta, and S. Chang. Performance analysis of Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography for SSL. In Proceedings of the ACM 
Wireless Internet Security Workshop (WiSe'02), Atlanta, 
USA, Sep. 28, 2002. ACM. 
6. P. Prasithsangaree and P. Krishnamurthy. On a framework 
for energy-efficient security protocols in wireless net-
works. Elsevier Computer Communications, 27:1716-
1729, 2004. 
7. S. Seys and B. Preneel. Power consumption evaluation of 
efficient digital signature schemes for low power devices. 
In Proc. 2005 IEEE International Conference on Wireless 
and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications 
(IEEE WiMOb 2005), volume 1, pages 79-86. IEEE, 2005. 
8. W. Freeman and E. Miller. An experimental analysis of 
cryptographic overhead in performance-critical systems. 
In Proc. 7th International Symposium on Modeling, Analy-
sis, and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication 
Systems (MASCOT'99), pages 348-357, College Park, 
Md., USA, October 1999. IEEE. 
9. M. Bohge and W. Trappe. TESLA certificates: an authen-
tication tool for networks of compute-constrained devices. 
2 
In Proc. of 6th international symposium on wireless per-
sonal multimedia communications (WPMC '03), Yoko-
suka, Kanagawa, Japan, October 2003. 
10. A. Roy-Chowdhury and J. S. Baras. A certificate-based 
5 light-weight authentication algorithm for resource-con-
strained devices. Technical Report CSHCN TR 2005-4, 
Center for Satellite and Hybrid Communication Networks, 
University of Maryland College Park, 2005. 
11. X. Ding, D. Mazzocchi, and G. Tsudik. Equipping smart 
10 	 devices with public key signatures. ACM Trans. Internet 
Technology, 7(1):3, 2007. 
12. "Compaq iPAQ Pocket PC H3600 series," http:// 
h18002.wwwl.hp.com/ 	 products/quickspecs/10632 
div/10632 div.HTML#%QuickSpecs. 
15 13. N. Potlapally, S. Ravi, A. Raghunathan, and N. Jha, A 
study of the energy consumption characteristics of crypto-
graphic algorithms and security protocols," Mobile Com-
puting, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 128-143, 
February 2006. 
20 14. A. Perrig, R. Canetti, D. Song, and J. D. Tygar. The 
TESLA broadcast authentication protocol. RSA Crypto-
bytes, Summer 2002. 
15. M. Naor and M. Yung. Universal one-way hash functions 
and their cryptographic applications. In STOC '89: Pro- 
25 ceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on 
Theory ofcomputing, pages 33-43, New York, N.Y., USA, 
1989. ACM. 
Security is a necessary parameter in networks (such as 
wireless networks, hybrid wireless networks, etc.) if the com- 
30 munication between a pair of nodes, or a group of nodes, is to 
be protected from unauthorized access. In wireless networks, 
due to the open nature of the wireless channel, intruders can 
eavesdrop on the communication between other nodes if the 
messages are sent in the clear; they can inject fake messages 
35 into the network, purporting to come from other nodes, or 
attempt to modify or delete messages between other nodes. 
Therefore, strong security mechanisms to prevent such 
attacks are important, especially for scenarios like military 
operations where hybrid wireless networks can be of great 
40 use. In this context, a hybrid wireless network refers to a 
network architecture in which there is some centralized infra-
structure, such as a satellite overlay, over large wireless net-
works. In such hybrid networks, the terrestrial wireless nodes 
are grouped into clusters, with each cluster having one or 
45 more "gateway" nodes with dual wireless and satellite con-
nectivity, providing alternate high-bandwidth and robust for-
warding paths through satellite links, in addition to the ter-
restrial wireless links. 
Security of communication can be achieved using several 
5o different mechanisms. Encryption hides the messages in 
cipher text and thus prevents eavesdropping on the commu-
nication. In the process of authentication, each message is 
"stamped" with a unique "marker" of the originating node 
which ensures that messages are accepted from legitimate 
55 nodes only, and fake messages are discarded. Associated with 
authentication are message integrity protocols where each 
message is similarly stamped with a unique marker by the 
originating node so that any unauthorized modification in 
transit invalidates the marker and thus the modification can be 
60 easily detected. 
For unicast communication, solutions for authentication 
and message integrity are trivial the two communicating 
parties A and B share a secret exclusively between themselves 
and make use of this secret, or a key derived thereof, to "sign" 
65 the messages between themselves. The secret or key used can 
be based on symmetric cryptography that is fast, efficient, and 
does not consume significant computation or energy 
US 8,397,062 B2 
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resources at the communicating nodes. The corresponding 	 pant has a unique secret with which to authenticate its mes- 
message signature is usually a Message Authentication Code, 	 sages, while allowing all the receivers the capability for 
or MAC in short (for example, HMAC <1>), which is 	 validation. This is assuming that the security association 
resource-efficient to compute and to verify, and limited in 	 between each source and the group of receivers is generated 
size. 	 5 on-the-fly, and does not make use of pre-shared secrets 
The problem is more complicated for group communica- 	 between every pair of nodes, which is the trivial solution that 
tion. When multiple parties are taking part in a communica- 	 does not scale well. 
tion session, a shared secret between the parties is not a 	 Therefore, it is an objective of the present disclosure to 
solution. For group communication, it is preferable that 	 provide an asymmetric user authentication protocol for group 
authentication be done based on asymmetric techniques 10 communication, which would be especially useful where 
where each node possesses a unique secret known to no other 	 wireless mobile devices or devices where energy is a precious 
node, and makes use of that secret to authenticate itself, or the 	 resource are used. User authentication/source authentication 
messages it generates. Public key cryptography allows such 	 refers to the scheme by which a node proves to another node 
asymmetric authentication to take place. In public-key cryp- 	 its identity, for example, node A claims to be node A and 
tography, each source uses its private key to sign messages it 15 proves to node B that it is indeed node A. The techniques 
generates, creating a digital signature that is appended to the 	 described in the present disclosure are based on a class of 
message <2>. The receivers can verify the signature using the 	 certificates called TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tol- 
corresponding public key of the node, which is known to 	 erant Authentication Certificates) certificates. A prior art 
everyone from the source's certificate. The primary require- 	 TESLA source/user authentication protocol was proposed in 
ment is that all users have access to a common third party 20 <14>. An authentication protocol using a TESLA certificate 
node called the Certificate Authority (CA) that is universally 	 concept was originally proposed in <9>, and modifications 
trusted. The CA is responsible for binding a node's identity to 	 and extensions to it were suggested in <10>. However, the 
its public key in the node's public-key certificate for 	 prior art has certain problems which the provide motivation 
example, PGP <3> and X.509 <4>, which are the two most 	 for the present disclosure. 
commonly used certificate formats. The certificate can be 25 	 In the TESLA certificate proposal described in <9>, the 
freely distributed to all nodes in a network, and the correct- 	 TESLA certificate algorithm allows a node to add authenti- 
ness of the certificate is verifiable by any node that has access 	 cation to packets it sends for a single period in time. The 
to the CA. 	 lifetime of the certificate is short. Therefore, a source node 
FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a group communication 	 that transmits for multiple time intervals will need several 
scheme based on the public key infrastructure. Node A 101, 30 TESLA certificates from the CA. If there are many sources 
Node B 102, and Node C 103 are nodes (exemplarily these 	 that send data over long intervals, this can add up to a sub- 
nodes could be wireless nodes such as cell-phone units) 	 stantial overhead. The prior art algorithm focuses on point- 
which communicate with each other and there exists a central 	 to-point authentication between nodes of varying capabili- 
node 104, which is trusted by each of the nodes 101,102, and 	 ties, for example, between a sensor node and its base station. 
103. The central node acts as a certificate authority and issues 35 It does not address authentication between peer nodes, or 
each of the nodes 101, 102, and 103 their respective certifi- 	 authentication in group communication. The algorithm also 
cates which include among other things their respective iden- 	 does not provide non-repudiation. Non-repudiation is a secu- 
tities and their public keys. Assume thatA sends message X to 	 rity term which means that a sender node cannot deny, at a 
B. Node A transmits to Node B message X, hash(X) signed 	 later instant in time, that it had generated a message (in the 
with the private key of X, and the certificate for A. Node B 40 past) that had been signed using its private key. Non-repudia- 
receives the whole packet and retrieves hash'(X) using the 	 tion is an essential aspect of source authentication protocols 
public key of A obtained from the certificate for A. Next, 	 for both unicast and group communication. 
Node B takes a hash of the message X and compares that to 
hash'(X). If they match, the message is authenticated and 	 SUMMARY 
verified as coming from node A. 	 45 
Public-key cryptography is a powerful tool that facilitates 	 Exemplary embodiments of the present invention address 
authentication, message integrity and also data encryption. 	 at least the above problems and/or disadvantages and other 
However, it is computationally very expensive (both in CPU 	 disadvantages not described above. Also, the present inven- 
cycles and energy expenditure) to generate digital signatures 	 tion is not required to overcome the disadvantages described 
for messages, and also to verify them <5,6,7,8>. The public 5o above, and an exemplary embodiment of the present inven-
and private keys are larger in size compared to symmetric 	 tion may not overcome any of the problems listed above. 
keys, and the certificates also take up considerable storage 	 According to an exemplary embodiment, an extended 
space. In wireless networks where many of the nodes might 	 TESLA source authentication algorithm is provided that uses 
have resource constraints, public-key cryptography can be a 	 symmetric cryptographic primitives to achieve asymmetric 
severe burden. For example, handheld devices have limited 55 authentication of nodes in group communication, and also 
processor power, storage capacity and available energy. Per- 	 message integrity. The protocol (source authentication algo- 
forming digital signature generation and verification fre- 	 rithm) can be efficiently implemented in any network that has 
quently can consume significant processor capacity and drain 	 some centralized infrastructure, and will be especially advan- 
the battery quickly. Therefore in wireless networks, hybrid 	 tageous for hybrid wireless networks which can take advan- 
wireless networks, or in any network with resource con-  60 tage of the presence of the satellite overlay infrastructure. The 
strained nodes, it is preferable to use authentication protocols 	 protocol considers the resource limitations of the wireless 
that are based on symmetric cryptographic primitives being 	 nodes and the wireless characteristics of the terrestrial seg- 
efficient in terms of processing load, symmetric operations 	 ment. 
would expend less node energy. However, designing authen- 	 According to another exemplary embodiment, a new light- 
tication protocols for group communication using symmetric 65 weight certificate which can be used in authentication is pro- 
cryptography is a significant challenge. The primary diffi- 	 vided. A central node issues this certificate to a node request- 
culty is how to create the asymmetry such that each partici- 	 ing the certificate and the central node includes in the 
US 8,397,062 B2 
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certificate a second key derived from a first key, which is sent 
to the central node by the node. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
The above and other features and advantages of the present 
invention will become more apparent by describing in detail 
exemplary embodiments thereof with reference to the 
attached drawings in which: 
FIG.1 illustrates an example of a conventional group com-
munication scheme based on the public key infrastructure. 
FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary authentication key chain 
generated by a certificate authority using a random seed key 
generated by the certificate authority. 
FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary authentication key chain 
generated by a source node using a random seed key gener-
ated by the source node. 
FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary method for generating cer-
tificates. 
FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary certificate generated by the 
certificate authority. 
FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary extended TESLA authen-
tication protocol in which the certificate authority is used as 
proxy for storing and distributing the TESLA keys of the 
source nodes. 
FIG. 7A illustrates an exemplary system according to the 
present disclosure. 
FIG. 7B illustrates an exemplary central node according to 
the present disclosure. 
FIG. 7C illustrates an exemplary mobile terminal accord-
ing to the present disclosure. 
FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary source authentication pro-
tocol. 
FIG. 9 illustrates simulation results comparing the process-
ing delay per packet of the conventional RSA based source 
authentication scheme with the novel extended TESLA 
authentication protocol. 
FIG. 10 illustrates simulation results comparing the energy 
consumption of conventional source authentication schemes 
with the novel extended TESLA authentication protocol. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure will 
now be described more fully with reference to the accompa-
nying drawings. 
In order to describe the operation of the extended TESLA 
source authentication protocol according to an exemplary 
embodiment, consider a group of three wireless nodes A, B 
and C, where A sends messages to B and C. It will be under-
stood that the number of source nodes (wireless nodes in this 
example) has been shown to be three. However, the number 
three is just an example and any number of source nodes can 
be accommodated in this design. The objective is to design an 
authentication mechanism that allows B and C to securely 
authenticate messages from A using a computationally effi-
cient algorithm that expends low node energy. The following 
assumptions are made about the initial security setup of the 
network for authentication purposes: 
All three nodes have limited energy and processing power, 
and none has any pre-existing security information about the 
others; the public key +KcA  of the CA is available to all nodes; 
all nodes are time-synchronized with the CA; appropriate 
security policies are in place to allow each node to securely 
identify itself to the CA during the initial bootstrapping 
phase, and each node X shares a unique secret key K cA
,X
with 
the CA; one-way functions F, and F 2 <15> are publicly avail- 
6 
able; message transmission from A to B and C start at time t o ; 
and time is divided into intervals, each of duration A. 
During the initial setup, before any messages are transmit-
ted in the network, the CA and all sources (A, B, and C) 
5 generate the keys that each will need for message authentica-
tion. The sets of keys are generated using the well-known 
TESLA algorithm. The CAuses a TESLAkey chain {tKcA,,}, 
i={1, ... , N} to authenticate the TESLA certificates that it 
generates for the group sources. The CA generates a random 
to seed s,A,,v  and applies one-way function F 1 to s,,,,  , to form 
the following hash chain 
F1 	 F1 	 F1 	 F1 	 Equation 1 
15 	
SCq 	 1 0 - SCA - ... f SCA,N-1 - SCA,N 
where N>0 is equal to the number of unique MAC keys that 
the CA expects to use for authenticating the certificates and 
messages it generates. The value N depends on the length of 
20 each time interval and the total duration that the CA node will 
perform the function of the CA. It is assumed that in each time 
interval, the CA uses only one key for computing the MACS 
on all the messages it generates in that time interval. There-
fore, if the total time of CA's functionality is T and the 
25 interval for key disclosure is d, 
T 
N  
30 
Subsequently the CA applies function F z to each element 
of the hash chain (equation 1 above) to obtain the certificate 
keys tKcA,i  as illustrated in FIG. 2 and which the CA uses in 
the certificates it generates. scA,o  is the anchor element of the 35 CA's authentication key chain (also referred to above as the 
hash chain). All TESLA certificates and signed messages 
from the CA are authenticated based on the anchor element 
during the initial protocol run. 
Importantly, the anchor element of the CA's authentication 
40 key chain, i.e., the element ScA,o,  is broadcast to the network 
at time t<to . The CA generates a public-key based digital 
signature on the message containing the anchor element and 
broadcasts the message with the signature as follows: 
45 	 CA—network:(s, o,SIGN_KS,4( ... )) 	 Equation 2 
The anchor element may itself be authenticated by the 
other network nodes using traditional public-key cryptogra-
phy. All network nodes receiving the broadcast message 
verify the signature on the broadcast message (equation 2) 
50 using the public key +KcA  of the CA. If the signature is 
verified, the nodes store in local memory the key scA,o  along 
with the broadcast message. 
In a manner similar to the above, source node A generates 
a random seed key sA n  and applies one-way function F, to sA n 
55 to form its authentication key chain (also referred to as a hash 
chain), before any messages are sent by A. A subsequently 
applies F2 to each key sA , generated above and obtains the 
output s'A , as illustrated in FIG. 3. Similarly, each of the 
source nodes B and C would generate their authentication key 
60 chains. 
Here n>0 is equal to the number of unique MAC keys that 
A expects to use for authenticating its messages. The value n 
depends on the length of each time interval and the total 
duration of A's transmission. In here, it is assumed that in 
65 each time interval A, a source uses only one key for comput-
ing the MACS on all the messages it generates in that time 
interval. Therefore, if the total time of A's transmission is T, 
US 8,397,062 B2 
7 
T 
n- - 0 
It should be noted that n, which is the number of unique MAC 
keys in A's key chain may or may not be equal to N, which is 
the number of unique keys in the CA's key chain (FIG. 2). 
FIG. 4 illustrates a method by which the CA generates a 
certificate for source node A. FIG. 4 only illustrates the 
method with respect to source node A; however, the same 
method may be used to create certificates for each of the other 
source nodes B and C. In 5401, at time t <to, A sends s,,,, (the 
random seed key for A's key chain) and the number n to the 
CA, along with details on A's key disclosure interval A. The 
message from A to the CA may be secured using a shared 
secret KcA,4  between A and the CA. The CA obtains all the 
elements ofA's authentication key chain from s,,,, and n, as in 
equation I and FIG. 3 because the CA also knows the one-
way functions Fl and F2. Similarly, the CA can obtain all the 
elements of B and C's authentication key chain when B and C 
request certificates from the CA. 
On successful verification ofA's identity, the CA generates 
the TESLA certificate (or more generally a certificate that can 
be used for authenticating A) for A in S402 using the random 
seed key received from A in S401. Next, the CA transmits the 
certificate to A: 
CA—A:Cert,(A) 
FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary certificate generated by the 
CA for source node A. The key s,,U which is the anchor 
element ofA's key chain is included in the certificate. The key 
s,,o is encrypted using the certificate key tKc,,,  from the 
CA's key chain from FIG. 2. The certificate also includes the 
identity of the source nodeA and the time to +d up to which the 
certificate is valid, i.e., after time t o+d, key s,, o is made public 
to the group and it can no longer be used for new messages. 
The certificate also contains a MAC for authentication, com-
puted on the previous elements using tK c,,,. For added secu-
rity, the certificate might also contain CA's public-key signa-
ture on all the previous elements. 
Cert, (A) —(IAA, [SA ,o}tKCA 1, to+ 
d,MAC KCAj  ... ),SIGN KCJ ... )) 
Here d?A is the key disclosure delay for the CA TESLA 
signature key, and tKc,,,  is the CA MAC key for the time 
period (to , to+d~ . 
FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary method for message trans-
mission and authentication using a central node (certificate 
authority). FIG. 6 is also a time diagram and illustrates the 
timing of the different steps in the exemplary method. In 
S601, the central node (CA) transmits the anchor element 
(sc,,o) of its authentication chain to all the nodes (A, B, and C 
are exemplarily shown in FIG. 6) to which itis connected. The 
anchor element may be signed by the central node and then 
transmitted as shown in equation 2 above. Of course, it is 
possible that the CA transmits the anchor element to only a 
subset of nodes depending on various conditions such as time 
of the day, or any other preference. Furthermore, it is also 
possible that the CA broadcast one of the earlier keys in the 
authentication key chain of A. It will be apparent to one of 
ordinary skill in the art that the authentication protocol can be 
easily modified to not broadcast the anchor element first up 
and instead broadcast a key which was created before the 
anchor element. 
Now, assume that A is trying to send messages to B and C 
starting in the time interval ( t o , to +d 
~ 
. Therefore, prior to the 
starting of this time period, A requests a certificate from the 
8 
central node and sends to the central node the random seed 
key for its authentication key chain in S602. Once A receives 
a certificate similar to that shown in FIG. 5 in S603, A com-
putes a MAC over the message m o using s'A, o (from its authen- 
5 tication key chain FIG. 3) and includes its TESLA certificate 
Certc,(A) with the message and sends the complete packet to 
receivers B and C in S604. 
A—{B, C}: {M o I Mo : (mo,MAC, ,,o(m0),Cert, (,4))] 
10 The MAC of the message m o may be computed by taking 
its hash and signing the hash with s'A,o• 
Each of B and C checks the freshness of the received 
certificate by checking the timestamp of Cert c,(A) to make 
sure it has arrived within the period { t, t o+d 
~ 
. The receivers 
15 also check that s' A o is not publicly known, i.e., MAC,, o (mo) 
cannot yet be computed by them. If all the checks pass, $ and 
C store Mo in their respective buffers, else they discard the 
message. 
On or about time t i =to +d, in S605 the CA broadcasts the 
20 key sc,.1  to the network: 
CA—network: ({ to, to+d ~ ,SCA 1,SIGN_KCA ( ... )) 
If receiver B or C has received the anchor element scA,o, 
25 they can check the authenticity of scA,1  by verifying scA,l 
against scA,o•  This can be done by performing the one-way 
function Fl on scA,1  and comparing the result with scA,o• 
Alternatively, B or C can verify scA,1  from the signature 
using +KcA .Ifverification is successful, each receiver derives 
30 tKcA,1 from  scA,1  (as shown in FIG. 2) and uses tKcA,1  to 
verify the MAC on Cert cA(A). If the MAC is correct, receiver 
B obtains sA ,o from Cert cA (A) by decrypting with tKcA,1. 
Alternatively, it is also possible that the CA broadcast s A ,o . B 
obtains s'A ,o from sA ,o (as shown in FIG. 3). Then B checks 
35 MAC,, o(mo) using s'_4
,
0 and accepts m o if the MAC verifies 
correctly. B saves Cert cA (A) and the anchor element s_ 4 ,0 of 
A's key chain in long-term memory they are used for 
authenticating future keys and messages from A. 
Messages from A to B in subsequent time intervals use the 
40 corresponding key ofA's key chain to compute the MAC. For 
example, in steps S606 and S607, A transmits messages Ml 
and M2 but does not include its TESLA certificate in mes-
sages subsequent to M o, under the assumption that every 
receiver has received M o correctly. For example, in the period 
45 <ti , t,+A>, message from A to B would look like: 
A—B: {Mj I M: (m„MACS  a  .(m,))} 
At time t,+d, the CA broadcasts sA ,, to the network (in case 
of messages Ml and M2, in S608 the central node/CA broad- 
50 casts to the network S A,,). Since d>A, when s,,, is disclosed, 
A is no longer using s'A ,, for computing the MACS on its 
messages. Any receiver B that receives the CA broadcast, 
verifies that s,,, indeed belongs to A's MAC key chain by 
applying the one-way function Fl multiple times to the 
55 received key as shown below. 
F1 	 F1 	 F1 
	
SA - SA , i-1 	 ... 	 SA , O 
60 
The above verification is correct since F, is a secure one-
way function and s,, o has already been verified from Cert c, 
(A). However, if B wants to be additionally careful, it can 
verify s,,, going through the additional steps described above, 
65 using the CA key broadcast message and Cert c,(A). Addi-
tionally, B may verify the MAC on the received message by 
taking a hash on the received message Ml and then signing 
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where scA,o  has been verified before using +KcA . The 
receiver does not need to check CA's signature to verify scA, 
Thus messages from A to B and C can be authenticated. 
The above algorithm requires A to perform one signature 
verification to verify the certificate it receives from the CA. 
Each receiver also performs one signature verification on the 
anchor element broadcast message from the CA. All other 
messages from the CA and the sources can be authenticated 
using low-computation symmetric MACS. Moreover, sources 
and receivers do not have to perform clock synchronization 
directly with one another, synchronizing with the CA is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the protocol. This saves 
additional message rounds and protocol complexity, and also 
breaks the cyclical dependency between authentication and 
clock synchronization. 
In the above described exemplary implementation, the CA 
broadcasts the MAC keys of the source nodes to the network 
at periodic key disclosure intervals. In an exemplary hybrid 
network topology, a satellite may be used for providing CA 
services. The reasons for using the satellite as the CA may be 
as follows. The satellite is a network node that is always 
available, connected to the entire network, and is physically 
secure. The satellite has higher computing power with on-
board processing capability and higher storage compared to 
terrestrial wireless nodes. Its energy is technically infinite, 
since it is renewable via solar power. Therefore the satellite 
can perform processing-intensive cryptographic operations 
more efficiently compared to the terrestrial nodes. The pres-
ence of the satellite thus allows implementation of highly 
efficient and secure centralized authentication. In such an 
implementation, the satellite would generate the TESLA cer-
tificates for all the terrestrial user nodes, and would act as the 
proxy for the terrestrial nodes for disclosing the MAC keys 
used by the nodes for authentication and message integrity, 
i.e., as described above instead of the source node, the satel-
lite (CA) broadcasts the MAC keys at regular time intervals. 
Therefore the MAC keys reach all the user nodes in one 
broadcast transmission. This saves the delay in authentica-
tion, and reduces the processing load on the source nodes, and 
also the network transmission overhead. 
In an exemplary implementation, non-repudiation may be 
added to the extended TESLA authentication protocol by 
modifying the mechanism of key disclosure by the central 
node (or the CA). This may be achieved as follows. The 
source node (for example node A) would authenticate each 
message it sends to B and C by two or more MACS, computed 
using keys from two or more key chains, respectively. That is, 
the node A would generate more than one authentication key 
chain and each packet sent to node B will have the message 
5 and two or more MACS. The anchor element of each chain is 
shared between the source and the central node as described 
earlier. The anchor elements of all the key chains used by A 
are also included and bound to A's identity in A's certificate 
by the CA. 
10 	 Each receiver (B and/or C) buffers the message along with 
all the MACS if the basic security check is satisfied. The basic 
security check refers to checking the freshness of the certifi-
cate (if received) and checking whether the received packet 
arrived within a certain time interval. At the time of key 
15 disclosure, the CA broadcasts only one of the MAC keys out 
of the set of MAC keys for the given source node and mes-
sage. Each receiver verifies the single MAC associated with 
the key broadcast by the CA, and accepts the message as 
correct if the MAC is verified. If any receiver wants to be able 
20 to check the message for non-repudiation at a later time 
instant, it saves the message along with all its MACS. 
The CA discloses only one MAC key from the available set 
at the time of key disclosure. The MAC key that is disclosed 
by the CA is chosen at every disclosure instant, with uniform 
25 probability from the set of available keys for that time inter-
val. Therefore, the source cannot know in advance, with a 
high degree of probability, which key will be used by the 
receivers for authentication. Hence, if the source would like 
its messages to be accepted by the receivers, it will have to 
30 include all the MACS correctly computed with the corre-
sponding keys. 
If at a later instant in time, a receiver would like to prove 
that a message was indeed generated by the source (i.e., 
non-repudiation), the receiver can simply send a non-repu- 
35 diation request to the CA. Upon receiving the request, the CA 
discloses one of the previously undisclosed MAC keys for the 
message in question. The receiver can compute the MAC for 
the message with the newly disclosed key and compare the 
MAC with the set of MACS it had saved previously. If the CA 
4o and the receiver operates correctly, the newly computed MAC 
will match one of the saved MACS. Since: (i) the undisclosed 
MAC keys were known only to the source and the CA, and (ii) 
the CA is universally trusted, therefore the saved MAC must 
have been computed by the source using its MAC key and 
45 hence the message must have been generated by the source. 
Thus non-repudiation is achieved. 
The security of the above non-repudiation algorithm is 
proportional to the number of MACS included with each 
message. For two MACS per message, the probability of a 
50 particular key being disclosed by the CA is 0.5. This prob-
ability is called the r-factor, where r is an acronym for repu-
diation. The r-factor is computed as the inverse of the number 
of MACS included with each message. 
Instead of sending a request for an undisclosed key, the 
55 receiver may also send the entire message along with the 
saved MACS, to the CA. The CA itself will compute the 
MACS on the message with any one of the undisclosed keys 
and compare with the saved MACS sent by the receiver. Since 
the undisclosed keys are known only to the CA and the 
60 source, in the event of a match, the CA can confirm to the 
receiver that the message was indeed generated by the source. 
In the above-described extended TESLA authentication 
protocol, the central node/CA has been used to create and 
issue the certificates as well for acting as a proxy for distrib- 
65 uting the MAC keys of the source nodes. However, it will be 
understood that this functionality may be split between two 
units or processors. For example, a first unit/terminal/proces- 
the hash with the S'A,. Then the result is compared with the 
received MAC which was generated using S'A,,. 
It should be noted that the burden of disclosing the keys to 
the various receivers has been shifted to the central node/ 
certificate authority which now acts as a proxy for storing and 
distributing the keys for each of the other nodes. 
After the initial anchor element broadcast message from 
the CA signed with 
—KcA,  subsequent key disclosure mes-
sages from the CA can be authenticated using one-way 
chains. For example, CA discloses the key scA,  used in period 
{t, t+d ~ at time t+d. Subsequent key disclosure messages 
disclosing the keys scA,  may occur when messages from B 
(or a node other than A) are to be authenticated and a certifi-
cate needs to be provided for that node, at which time the CA 
may exemplarily broadcast scA,  where i>I because i=I has 
already been used forA. Any receiver can then verify that scA, 
belongs to CA's one-way chain: 
F, 	 F, 	 F, 
SCA i - SCA i-1 - ... - SCA,O 
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sor may generate and issue the certificates and the second 
unit/terminal/processor may generate and store the MAC 
keys of each of the source nodes, i.e., generate and store the 
complete authentication key chain illustrated in FIG. 3 for 
each of the source nodes. Furthermore, the second unit may 
also distribute the MAC keys at appropriate time intervals. 
It is also possible that the central node issues to a source 
node a single certificate, which has more than one anchor 
element. This may be the case when a source node is associ-
ated with different groups and has multiple authentication key 
chains. This will also be the case when the authentication 
framework includes non-repudiation, and thus the source 
node A computes two or more MACS on each message it 
sends. Therefore A's certificate will contain the anchor ele-
ments of all the key chains it uses to compute the two or more 
MACS. 
FIG. 7A illustrates an exemplary system which has a wire-
less access point 704, which acts as a central node/certificate 
authority. Mobile terminals 701, 702, and 703 communicate 
with each other and the access point 704. The mobile terminal 
could be a cell-phone, a device with wireless access such as 
the recently introduced IPAD by Apple, INC., etc. The wire-
less access point functionality could be provided by a server 
or any other terminal that can carry out many computations 
and is not necessarily energy constrained. 
FIG. 7B illustrates the basic building blocks of the central 
node 704. The central node 704 includes a receiver 704-1, a 
processor 704-2, and a transmitter 704-3. Similarly, FIG. 7C 
illustrates a mobile terminal 701 which includes a receiver 
701-1, processor 701-2, and transmitter 701-3. 
One of ordinary skill in the art will understand the appro-
priate hardware that would be used for each of these building 
blocks. For example, the processors may be digital signal 
processors, ASICS, etc. with a memory component. 
FIG. 8 is a simplified description of the extended TESLA 
authentication protocol discussed in FIG. 6. In S801, mobile 
terminal 1 (node A) 701 requests a certificate from the central 
node 704. Node A sends this request along with a first key 
from its authentication key chain. Exemplarily, the first key 
may be the root key/randomly generated seed key of its 
authentication key chain illustrated in FIG. 3. In S802, the 
receiver 704-1 of the central node receives the request and 
forwards the request to the processor 704-2. The processor 
derives a second key from the received first key and generates 
a certificate forA by including the second key therein. Exem-
plarily, the second key is the anchor element of the authenti-
cation key chain of node A. The second key is exemplarily 
derived by repeatedly applying a one-way function to the first 
key. The transmitter 704-3 then transmits the certificate to 
node A. Exemplarily, the central node obtains the complete 
authentication key chain of node A by using the information 
sent by node A, i.e., node A sends to the CA the number of 
MAC keys inA's authentication key chain and the seed key of 
A's authentication key chain. It is also possible that the cen-
tral node derive a second authentication key chain which has 
overlapping elements with A's authentication key chain. For 
example, the central node may generaten+x (wherex>l) keys 
instead of n keys which A generates using the seed key. 
In S803, node  sends a first packet to nodes B and C (702 
and 703). The rest of the description of FIG. 8 is with respect 
to node B; however, identical steps will be also be applicable 
to node C. If this is the first time that A and B are communi-
cating or if B does not know A, A includes in the packet: (1) 
the message (2) MAC on the message computed by taking a 
hash on the message and signing it with a key from its authen- 
12 
tication key chain (3) the certificate of A. The packet may be 
generated by processor 701-2 and sent using transmitter 701-
3. 
In S804, Node B receives the packet and performs a basic 
5 check on the packet. A basic check may include checking the 
freshness of the certificate. If the packet passes the basic 
check, the packet is stored in memory. In S805, the central 
node broadcasts a key from its own authentication key chain 
shown in FIG. 2. Exemplarily, the key for this broadcast may 
10 be the same key with which the second key was encrypted in 
the certificate issued to node A. 
In S806, node B verifies the MAC on the message stored in 
its memory and which was previously received from node A. 
15 This verification may be a two-step process. In a first step, the 
key broadcast in S805 is verified. In the second step, the MAC 
on the received message may be verified. If the MAC is 
verified, the message is authenticated as coming from node A. 
In S807, nodeA sends another packet to node B. This time, 
20 the packet does not include the certificate. In S808, node B 
performs a basic check on the message and stores the message 
in its memory. In S809, the central node 704 broadcasts 
another key but this time from the authentication key chain of 
node A that is computed using the seed key of node A's 
25 authentication key chain, and not its own key chain. Further-
more, keys that were created later in the authentication key 
chain are broadcast earlier. In S810, node B completes the 
message verification and authentication by using the key 
broadcast by the central node in S809. 
30 Next, results from the performance analysis of the scheme 
described in FIGS. 6 and 8 are presented with respect to FIGS. 
9 and 10. 
Compared to asymmetric source authentication using pub-
lic-key cryptography, the system and method described above 
35 offers much greater savings in power expenditure and pro-
cessing delay for authentication. An analysis of the process-
ing delay overhead of the proposed protocol, used with 
HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHAT, and its comparison to the 
processing delay for RSA signatures, is illustrated in FIG. 9, 
40 for a 500 MB message on a 500 MHz PentiumIII machine. 
The delay figures for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHAT are 
computed based on the approximation that each operation is 
executed in one processor clock tick for the 500 MHzPIII 
processor. The delay figures for RSA for the 500 MHzPIII 
45 processor are from <1 I>. The r-factor in the graphs refer to 
the degree of non-repudiation provided by a probabilistic 
non-repudiation algorithm that is used in the above described 
method, and is related to the number of TESLA MACS 
attached to each message. An r-factor equal to 1 indicates one 
50 MAC per message, which is described in the algorithm 
described above; while an r-factor 0.25 refer to 4 MACS per 
message, and so on. 
FIG. 10 compares the amount of energy that would be 
required to authenticate a 500 MB message on a representa- 
55 tive handheld computer <12> for different authentication 
algorithms. The base figures for energy expenditure of differ-
ent cryptographic operations of the handheld are obtained 
from <13>. Clearly, authenticating a 500 MB message with-
out additional energy sources is not possible except for the 
60 extended TESLA protocol described in the present disclo-
sure. The graphs validate the claim that the energy consump-
tion of the extended TESLA protocol of the present disclosure 
is significantly less in comparison to standard signature pro-
tocols. Here, it is assumed that up to 50% of the node energy 
65 is spent in authenticating the data packets. 
The disclosed extended TESLA authentication protocol 
has an additional advantage that it avoids the assumption that 
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the user nodes have some sort of security association estab- 	 that various changes in form and details may be made therein 
lished apriori, as many other prior art protocols assume. 	 without departing from the spirit and scope of the present 
The above described extended TESLA authentication pro- 	 invention as defined by the following claims. 
tocol has a wide variety of uses such as in broadcast authen- 	 What is claimed is: 
tication in sensor networks, authentication of control mes-  5 	 1. A central node for issuing certificates to a plurality of 
sages in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols, etc. An 	 nodes associated with the central node in a network, the 
example application of the authentication protocol would be 	 central node comprising: 
in digital transmission of paid television programming to be 	 a receiver that is configured to receive a first key from at 
displayed on hand-held wireless mobile smart devices 	 least one node from among the plurality of nodes; 
belonging to subscribers. The television network provider 10 	 a processor which is configured to generate a second key 
would be authenticating the video stream using its key chain, 	 based on the received first key and generate a certificate 
and broadcasting the video stream to the subscribers over the 	 for the at least one node; and 
satellite channels. The satellite itself would act as the CA and 	 a transmitter that is configured to transmit the generated 
the proxy and broadcast the keys to the receivers. The video 	 certificate to the at least one node, wherein: 
stream can be broken up into millions of packets at the IP-  15 	 the first key is a key from a first authentication key chain 
layer, and each packet is authenticated using keys from the 	 comprising a plurality of keys generated by the at least 
key chain. Inthis scenario, usingpublic-key authentication on 	 one node for use in authenticating messages transmit- 
the video stream packets would rapidly drain the battery of 	 ted by the at least one node, the at least one node 
the hand-held wireless mobile smart devices. Another 	 configured to generate a third authentication key 
example would be packet-level authentication of voice and 20 	 chain comprising a plurality of keys and further con- 
video being sent by soldiers on the ground to their command- 	 figured to authenticate messages using at least two 
ing station, where each soldier has a hand-held transmitter/ 	 message authentication codes that are computed 
receiver device capable of sending and receiving voice, video 	 using a unique key from each of the first authentica- 
and data using a satellite overlay. Here data being sent by the 	 tion key chain and the third authentication key chain, 
soldier to multiple other soldiers and/or the command post 25 	 and 
can be authenticated using the extended TESLA authentica- 	 the certificate generated by the processor includes the 
tion scheme. Likewise, the commands being sent from the 	 second key and an identity of the at least one node. 
commanding post to the soldiers in the field can be authenti- 	 2. The central node according to claim 1, wherein the first 
cated. 	 key is a first randomly generated seed key generated by the at 
Exemplary implementation described above with refer-  30 least one node, which uses the first randomly generated seed 
ence to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of meth- 	 key to generate remaining keys in the first authentication key 
ods, apparatus (systems) can be implemented using computer 	 chain of the at least one node by repeatedly applying a first 
program products. It will be understood that each block of the 	 one-way function. 
flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, and combina- 	 3. The central node according to claim 2, wherein the 
tions of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or block 35 processor is further configured to generate the first authenti- 
diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instruc- 	 cation key chain using the received first key by applying the 
tions. These computer program instructions may be provided 
	
first one-way function to the received first key. 
to a processor of a general purpose computer special purpose 	 4. The central node according to claim 3, wherein the 
computer or other programmable data processing apparatus 	 processor is further configured to generate a second authen- 
to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which 40 tication key chain by randomly generating a second seed key 
execute via the processor of the computer or other program- 	 and repeatedly applying the first one-way function, wherein 
mable data processing apparatus, create means for imple- 	 the second key is encrypted by a key from the second authen- 
menting the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or 	 tication key chain and the encrypted second key is included in 
block diagram block or blocks. For example, instructions 	 the certificate for the at least one node. 
embodied on a computer-readable medium can be executed 45 5. The central node according to claim 3, wherein the 
by a processor to provide the functionality of either the central 	 transmitter is configured to broadcast to the network a unique 
node or the other nodes (A, B, Q. 	 key from among the keys in the first authentication key chain, 
More generally, computer program instructions may be 	 and wherein the broadcast repeatedly occurs in time after a 
stored in a computer readable medium that can direct a com- 	 fixed interval. 
puter, or other programmable data processing apparatus, or 50 	 6. The central node according to claim 2, wherein the 
other devices to function in a particular manner, such that the 	 receiver is further configured to receive a third key from the at 
instructions stored in the computer readable medium produce 	 least one node, and wherein the processor is further config- 
an article of manufacture including instructions which imple- 	 ured to generate a fourth key based on the received third key. 
ment the function/act specified in the flowchart and/or block 
	
7. The central node according to claim 6, wherein the third 
diagram block or blocks. 	 55 key is a randomly generated seed key generated by the at least 
The computer program instructions may also be loaded 	 one node, which uses the third key to generate remaining keys 
onto a computer, other programmable data processing appa- 	 in the third authentication key chain of the at least one node by 
ratus, or other devices to cause a series of operational steps to 	 repeatedly applying a third one-way function. 
be performed on the computer, other programmable appara- 	 8. The central node according to claim 7, wherein the third 
tus or other devices to produce a computer implemented 60 one-way function is same as the first one-way function. 
process such that the instructions which execute on the com- 	 9. The central node according to claim 7, wherein the 
puter or other programmable apparatus provide processes for 	 processor is further configured to generate the third authen- 
implementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart 	 tication key chain using the received third key by applying the 
and/or block diagram block or blocks. 	 third one-way function to the received first key. 
While the present invention has been particularly shown 65 	 10. The central node according to claim 6, wherein the 
and described with reference to exemplary embodiments 	 fourth key is the anchor element in the third authentication 
thereof, it will be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art 	 key chain of the at least one node. 
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11. The central node according to claim 1, wherein the 
second key is the anchor element in the first authentication 
key chain of the at least one node. 
12. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium 
storing program instructions for execution by a processor, the 
program instructions , when executed , configured to cause the 
processor to perform operations comprising: 
receiving a first key from at least one node from among a 
plurality of nodes; 
generating a second key based on the received first key and 
generating a certificate for the at least one node; and 
transmitting the generated certificate to the at least one 
node, wherein: 
the first key is a key from a first authentication key chain 
comprising a plurality of keys generated by the at least 
one node for use in authenticating messages transmit-
ted by the at least one node, the at least one node 
configured to generate a third authentication key 
chain comprising a plurality of keys and further con-
figured to authenticate messages using at least two 
message authentication codes that are computed 
using a unique key from each of the first authentica-
tion key chain and the third authentication key chain, 
and 
the certificate generated by the processor includes the 
second key and an identity of the at least one node. 
13. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 12, 
wherein the program instructions are configured to cause the 
processor to perform operations further comprising: 
generating the first authentication key chain by applying a 
one-way function to the received first key. 
14. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 12, 
wherein the program instructions are configured to cause the 
processor to perform operations further comprising: 
receiving a third key from the at least one node; and 
generating a fourth key based on the received third key. 
15. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 14, 
wherein the third key is a key from the third authentication 
16 
key chain comprising a plurality of keys generated by the at 
least one node for use in authenticating messages transmitted 
by the at least one node. 
16. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 14, 
5 wherein the second key is the anchor element in the first 
authentication key chain and the fourth key is the anchor 
element in the third authentication key chain. 
17. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 14, 
wherein the certificate generated by the processor includes 
10 
the fourth key. 
18. A system comprising: 
• central node; 
• first node; and 
• second node, wherein the central node is trusted by the 
first and second nodes, and wherein: is 	
the central node generates and stores a first authentica- 
tion key chain comprising a plurality of first keys, 
the first node generates a second authentication key 
chain comprising a plurality of second keys and a 
third authentication key chain, 
~~ 	 the plurality of first keys and the plurality of second keys 
overlap at least partially, 
the first node authenticates a message sent to the second 
node using at least two message authentication codes, 
each of the at least two message authentication codes 
25 computed using a unique key from the second authen-
tication key chain and the third authentication key 
chain, and 
the central node broadcasts a key that is used by the 
30 	
second node to verify the message ascomingfromthe 
first node. 
19. The system of claim 18, wherein the central node 
generates a fourth authentication key chain comprising a 
plurality of fourth keys and randomly selects the broadcast 
35 key from the plurality of first keys and the plurality of fourth 
keys. 
20. The system of claim 18, wherein the first node selects 
the broadcast key from the first authentication key chain. 
